Normalisation of India-China ties, an unlikely phenomenon

The larger issue of deployment of over 60,000 Chinese troops close to the border, as well as massive infrastructure development works, a still to be negotiated. The denial of traditional patrolling areas along the LAC in Depsang plains and Demchock by the Chinese forces is also yet to be restored

Indian and Chinese troops disengaged at a border friction point in the Gogra Heights-Hot Springs area near Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in the eastern Ladakh sector along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Disengagement has not come a day too soon. This area is the last flashpoint created by deliberate Chinese aggression in the Ladakh sector of the Indo-Tibetan border in the summer of 2020 to alter the status quo. Since then, sustained talks at the military level have seen the two armies step back a bit from the face-off points.

The process started on September 8 after the discussions between the two sides during the 16th round of military Corps Commander level talks on July 17. The process got over on September 13, days before a possible meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on September 15 and 16.

The disengagement process included dismantling infrastructure built by the two sides at the location where they had deployed troops and other assets. Patrol Point 15 at Hot springs was a significant area of confrontation in May 2020, with over a thousand Chinese PLA troops and heavy weapons deployed across the LAC. By July 2020, most of these soldiers had been withdrawn as per an agreement at the Corps Commander level, but a small detachment of 50 odd soldiers remained in the area that has now pulled back. With the disengagement at PP-15 completed, troops of the two countries have disengaged at all flashpoints in the region, which included the Galwan area, two banks north and south of the Pangong Tso lake, PP-14, PP-15 and PP-17A.

However, the larger issue of deployment of over 60,000 Chinese troops close to the border, as well as massive infrastructure development works, a still to be negotiated. The denial of traditional patrolling areas along the LAC in Depsang plains and Demchock by the Chinese forces is also yet to be restored.

Depsang encroachment remains a major issue

The major issue for India remains the encroachment by the Chinese troops in Depsang Bulge, a plateau located towards India's crucial Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) airstrip and Karakoram Pass north close to China's western highway. The PLA blocks the Indian Army from patrolling in Depsang, around 18 km inside what India considers its territory. Indian military describes obstructions to patrolling at the Depsang plains as a legacy issue, with the PLA resorting to such tactics in the areas since 2013. However, since 2020 China has deployed a permanent force at the bottleneck in Depsang to deny access to traditional patrolling points to Indian troops. While the pitching of tents on the Indian side near the Charding Ninglung Nallah (CNN) track junction at Demchock by so-called Chinese civilians since 2018 is also an older issue that is not connected to the Chinese incursion in 2020, which led to a deadly clash at Galwan.

Normalisation of ties, a long way off

China's surprise incursions in April-May 2020 across the LAC in Ladakh violated a range of bilateral agreements negotiated by Delhi and Beijing over the last three decades to stabilise the disputed frontier. This shattered India's political trust in China, which was already weakened by three major military standoffs earlier during the 2013 Depsang standoff, Chumar 2014 located in the Demchock area, and at Doklam, near the tri-junction point between India, China, and Bhutan in 2017. To make matters worse, the Galwan clashes between the two sides in mid-June 2020 saw blood shedding for the first time on the China frontier in nearly five decades. Since then, the bilateral relationship has taken a deep downhill trend.

India imposed a series of economic measures against China and matched the eye-to-eye PLA deployments on the border. India insisted that it is no longer business as usual with China and restoring the status quo ante on the border was a precondition for the normalisation of the relationship. China, however, argued that India should not overstate the conflict on the border and focus on broadening the bilateral relationship. However, Delhi repeatedly reaffirmed that the "state of the border" reflects the "state of the relationship". India combined this firm political position with a patient negotiation at the military level. Delhi also stepped up its security cooperation with the US and revived the Quadrilateral forum (QUAD) with Australia, Japan, and the US.

The completion of disengagement has raised hopes for renewing high-level political dialogue between Modi and Xi at the sidelines of the SCO summit. India would like to see the disengagement followed by a de-escalation of the military confrontation by pulling the troops on both sides to their peacetime locations. It would also want the resolution of two other points of confrontation in Ladakh in the Depsang plains in the north and the Demochok valley in the south that preceded the 2020 crisis. India has made it repeatedly clear that unless troop disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction to defuse the border crisis are undertaken, there will be no improvement in the overall bilateral relations with China.

However, China is ramping up its military and logistical modernisation in Tibet and building new settlements right on the edge of the border. It indicates that China is not willing to step back. Consequently, India's challenges on the border are not only daunting amidst the growing military power gap with China, but there seems to be no easy return to the once peaceful border normalcy.

(The author is a journalist who writes on defence, strategic affairs and technology)