India has to evolve a balanced defence relationship with the world
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea could become important allies
image for illustrative purpose
Global military expenditure rose for the eighth consecutive year in 2022 to reach an estimated $2240 billion, the highest level ever recorded by SIPRI. Despite the 3.7 per cent year-on-year increase in spending, world military expenditure as a share of world gross domestic product (GDP)—the military burden—remained at 2.2 per cent because the global economy also grew in 2022.
Governments around the world spent an average of 6.2 per cent of their budgets on military, which comes to a cool $282 per person. China’s ongoing military modernization and increased spending by India and Japan have been major factors towards pushing military spending in the region. Military spending by China, the world’s second largest spender, rose for the 28th consecutive year, by 4.2 per cent.
This narrowed the gap between its spending and that of the United States. While the USA remained by far the largest military spender, exceptionally high levels of inflation transformed a nominal increase in military spending of 8.8 per cent into a 0.7 per cent real-term increase. As a consequence, overall military spending in the Americas rose only slightly, by 0.3 per cent
India’s defence atma nirbharta plans have gotten new wings after big-ticket projects from the US and France. However, engaging both strategic partners on aircraft jet engine deals raises a wider question. It has been argued that India would own intellectual property over the co-developed jet engine with Safran, unlike the GE F-414, which is to be a co-production.
Indian has been a traditional ally of Russia while the United States supported Pakistan. As Russia peaked in its technical prowess, India benefitted in terms of acquiring aircraft carriers and Brahmos. Following 9/11, Washington slowly moved away from Pakistan. Despite, the Russian invasion of Ukraine putting India in a diplomatic spot, the latter continued its partial support of Russia by not complying with US sanctions and buying Russian oil to protect its interests. However, India cannot assume the US will be the dominant ally in the future.
In the current scenario, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea could become important allies in India’s defence preparedness programme. After France’s Rafale won the tender and should have been awarded the contract, it was scuttled for various reasons and it is now surfacing in a new avatar. Germany and France can provide submarines. Their cooperation will have to be taken into consideration to manufacture with an Indian partner with proven skill sets.
The West cannot wean it away from Russian dependence as the current situation does not warrant it. But once the war is over it will bounce back and could become a formidable foe and India would do well to have the on their side rather than have them lean towards China. Despite being North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, the United States and France have their own share of differences. The former sees itself as the leader of the west, while France is a leader in the aerospace industry. American and French companies are staunch competitors in the defence and aerospace sector both in commercial and defence aviation. They frequently outbid each other for global contracts and are expected to compete fiercely in India’s defence market. This competition is not merely commercial because military contractors must devote significant profits to research and development (R&D) to maintain technological edge.
The US and France are vital strategic partners for India because they bring unique advantages to the table that the other do not. At the same time, both have their limitations.
The US has interests in building India’s capabilities as the regional stabiliser in the Indian Ocean and a bulwark against China. Second, the relationship has added perks: India becomes a de facto part of US intelligence architecture, including maritime domain awareness, and access to high-end technologies that France cannot provide.
Meanwhile, France needs to be cultivated as an alternate supplier of advanced defence platforms.
Along with Europe, it does not tow a hard line on China. Thus, it can at best be the second-fiddle defence partner to the US.
At this stage, India has far more strategic relationship with the US than France. Still, the latter is critical in not ceding an asymmetric leverage to the US in the future.
